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Abstract
This paper presents a property of propositional theories under the answer sets semantics
(called Equilibrium Logic for this general syntax): any theory can always be reexpressed
as a strongly equivalent disjunctive logic program, possibly with negation in the head.
We provide two different proofs for this result: one involving a syntactic transformation,
and one that constructs a program starting from the countermodels of the theory in the
intermediate logic of here-and-there.
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1 Introduction
One of the most interesting consequences from research in declarative semantics for
Logic Programming (LP) has probably been the progressive increase in expressive-
ness that the field has experienced over the years. A clear example of this trend is the
case of the stable models (or answer sets) semantics (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988),
which meant the first satisfactory treatment of default negation, and whose simplic-
ity directly allowed new extensions like the use of disjunction (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991)
and negation (Lifschitz and Woo 1992; Inoue and Sakama 1998) in the rule heads.
In one of the most general formalizations (Lifschitz et al. 1999) of answer sets,
logic programs consist of rules whose head and body are nested expressions, that
is, propositional formulas without the connectives for implication and equivalence.
The intuitive behavior of these nested expressions is well understood: in fact, it is
quite analogous to the way in which we nest operators in Prolog. To put an example
of their utility, a set of rules like:
a ← b a ← c ∧ ¬d
e ∨ p ← b e ∨ p ← c ∧ ¬d
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can be “packed” into the single rule with nested expressions:
a ∧ (e ∨ p) ← b ∨ (c ∧ ¬d) (1)
In (Lifschitz et al. 1999), it was also shown that these rules with nested expres-
sions can always be unfolded back into usual program rules (that allow disjunction
and negation in the head) and, moreover, that this replacement can be done locally,
regardless of the context (this last property of the transformation has the name of
strong equivalence).
In view of a commonly used abbreviation (see section 2.2), nested logic programs
allow a free use of all the usual connectives for logic programs, excepting for im-
plication, the only one that cannot be nested. This last syntactic restriction has
been eventually removed thanks to the result established in (Lifschitz et al. 2001).
In that work, it was shown that the answer sets semantics is further generalized
by Equilibrium Logic (Pearce 1997), which just deals with arbitrary propositional
theories, imposing a selection criterion on their models under the intermediate logic
of here-and-there (Heyting 1930). As a result, theories containing, for instance, a
rule in the scope of a disjunction:
(p← q) ∨ r (2)
or a rule as body of other rule:
p← (q ← r) (3)
have now an interpretation in terms of answer sets. Although from a purely log-
ical point of view, ruling out syntactic restrictions is a clear advantage, from the
LP viewpoint one may wonder, however, what the practical interest of dealing
with arbitrary formulas is. A recent example of their utility has been provided
in (Ferraris 2005), where nonmonotone aggregates are expressed using rules as part
of a body rule. To give an example, according to (Ferraris 2005), the following rule
with an aggregate in the body1:
p ← 0 ≤ {q = 1, r = −1} (4)
is translated as (3).
Despite of their interest, the intuition on how arbitrary theories may behave as
“programs” was still far from obvious. Until now, we missed a formal connection
with the usual rule format of pairs of head and body. Furthermore, we did not even
know whether they provide a real increase in expressiveness, or perhaps they can
always be translated instead into a strongly equivalent program (as in the case of
nested expressions). In this paper we show that, in fact, the latter happens to be
the case. In other words, the main result states that:
every propositional theory is strongly equivalent to a logic program.
1 Although aggregates are out of the scope of this note, the intuitive meaning of this rule would
be to make p true whenever the addition of the numeric weights in (4) for those atoms in {q, r}
that are true is greater than or equal to zero.
Propositional Theories are Strongly Equivalent to Logic Programs 3
From an LP reading, this result is pointing out that any generic propositional theory
can be seen as “shorthand” for a logic program. Furthermore, the transformation
from a propositional theory to a logic program is modular, i.e., it can be done
formula by formula. For instance, formula (3) inside any theory can be simply
replaced by the rules:
p ← ¬r
p ← q
p ∨ ¬q ∨ r ←
and similarly (2) can be replaced by:
p ∨ r ← q
¬q ∨ r ← ¬p
Another possible reading of the main result is that the form of logic programs is
a kind of normal form for arbitrary formulas from the point of view of Equilibrium
Logic.
The main result is independently proven in two ways: (1) with a syntactic re-
cursive transformation, and (2) with a method that builds a strongly equivalent
program starting from the countermodels (in the logic of here-and-there) of the
propositional theory. Presenting the two proofs is interesting for several reasons.
First, we get in this way an interesting analogy with the two ways of transforming
a formula into CNF in classical logic: using a syntatic transformation or building
the formula from its countermodels. Second, both proofs may provide technical
tools for achieving other interesting results, as we explain later in the conclusions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the preliminaries,
with brief reviews of the logic of here-and-there and of answer sets semantics. In
Section 3 we present the first proof of the main result, based on the recursive
syntactic transformation, whereas Section 4 contains the second proof, which builds
a program from the here-and-there countermodels of the original theory. In Section 5
we further explore the analogies to classical logic, and obtain a disjunctive normal
form based on the here-and-there models.
2 Preliminaries
Before introducing the logic of here-and-there, a small remark about notation. We
assume that we handle a set of atoms Σ called the propositional signature. We
will use letters X,Y, . . . to denote propositional interpretations in classical logic,
represented here as sets of atoms, that is, subsets of Σ. For any propositional formula
F , we adopt the usual notation X |= F to stand for X satisfies F under classical
logic.
2.1 Logic of here-and-there
The logic of here-and-there was originally defined in (Heyting 1930). A propositional
formula is any combination of atoms in Σ with connectives ⊥ (false), ∨, ∧, and →.
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We also define the abbreviations:
¬F
def
= F → ⊥
⊤
def
= ⊥ → ⊥
F ≡ G
def
= (F → G) ∧ (G→ F )
As usual, a propositional theory is a (possibly infinite) set of propositional formulas.
The semantics of the logic of here-and-there is defined as follows. An interpreta-
tion is a pair (X,Y ) of sets of atoms (respectively called “here” and “there”) such
that X ⊆ Y . Intuitively, atoms in X are considered to be true, atoms not in Y are
considered to be false, and the rest (Y −X) are thought to be undefined. We say
that an interpretation (X,Y ) is total when X = Y (no undefined atoms).
Definition 1 (satisfaction of formulas)
We recursively define2 when an interpretation (X,Y ) satisfies a formula F , written
(X,Y ) |= F , as follows:
• for any atom a, (X,Y ) |= a if a ∈ X ,
• (X,Y ) 6|= ⊥,
• (X,Y ) |= F ∧G if (X,Y ) |= F and (X,Y ) |= G,
• (X,Y ) |= F ∨G if (X,Y ) |= F or (X,Y ) |= G,
• (X,Y ) |= F → G if (X,Y ) |= F implies (X,Y ) |= G, and Y |= F → G.

Although we use the same symbol ‘|=’ for satisfaction in classical logic and the
logic of here-and-there, ambiguity is avoided in view of the difference in the form
of the interpretation on the left. In this way, the last line of Definition 1 is referring
to classical satisfaction for Y |= F → G. As usual, an interpretation is a model of a
theory T if it satisfies all the formulas in T . Two formulas (theories) are equivalent
if they have the same models.
As a first immediate observation about Definition 1, note that when the inter-
pretation is total (X=Y ), (Y, Y ) |= F simply collapses into classical satisfaction
Y |= F . Another interesting property we will use later is that truth in the “here”
component implies truth in the “there” component:
Property 1
For any interpretation (X,Y ) and any propositional theory T :
if (X,Y ) |= T then (Y, Y ) |= T (i.e., Y |= T ).
When dealing with countermodels, this property can be rephrased as: if (Y, Y )
is a total countermodel of T , then any (X,Y ) is also a countermodel of T . Besides,
using the definition of ¬F as F → ⊥, it also allows us to obtain the following
characterization of satisfaction for negated formulas:
2 We have slightly simplified the definition in comparison with the usual definition of satisfaction
in the logic of here-and-there which is typically provided in terms of a Kripke structure as in
intuitionistic logic, but just handling two worlds in this case. It can be easily seen that both
definitions are equivalent.
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Property 2
For any interpretation (X,Y ) and any formula F :
(X,Y ) |= ¬F iff Y |= ¬F .
Axiomatically, the logic of here-and-there is intermediate between intuitionistic
and classical logic. Recall that a natural deduction system for intuitionistic logic can
be obtained from the corresponding classical system (Bibel and Eder 1993, Table 3)
by dropping the law of the excluded middle
F ∨ ¬F
from the list of postulates. The logic of here-and-there, on the other hand, is the
result of replacing the excluded middle in the classical system with the weaker
axiom schema (Jongh and Hendriks 2003):
F ∨ (F → G) ∨ ¬G. (5)
In addition to all intuitionistically provable formulas, the set of theorems of the
logic of here-and-there includes, for instance, the weak law of the excluded middle
¬F ∨ ¬¬F
and De Morgan’s law
¬(F ∧G) ≡ ¬F ∨ ¬G
(the dual law can be proved even intuitionistically).
The logic of here-and-there differs from intuitionistic logic also as far as minimal
adequate sets of connectives are concerned. In fact, a disjunction
F ∨G
is equivalent (Lukasiewicz 1941), in the logic of here-and-there, to
((F → G)→ G) ∧ ((G→ F )→ F ).
2.2 Logic programs
The set of logic programs can be defined as a subset of propositional formulas as
follows. A nested expression is any propositional formula not containing implications
of the form F → G with G 6= ⊥ (i.e., negations and ⊤ are allowed). A rule r is
a formula of the form F → G where F and G are nested expressions3. The head
and the body of r are respectively defined as head(r) = G and body(r) = F . When
convenient, we will implicitly consider any nested expression G as the rule ⊤ → G.
As usual, a literal is any atom a or its negation ¬a. A rule is said to be nonnested
when it has the form:
(l1 ∧ · · · ∧ lm)→ (lm+1 ∨ · · · ∨ ln)
3 Traditionally, rules F → G are written in the form G← F we used in the introduction. Besides,
¬ is usually written as not, ∧ as comma and ∨ as semicolon.
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(0 ≤ m ≤ n) where l1, . . . , ln are literals. An empty conjunction (m = 0) is under-
stood as the formula ⊤ and analogously, an empty disjunction (n = m) is repre-
sented as ⊥.
A (logic) program is a propositional theory consisting of rules; a program is
nonnested when all its rules are nonnested.
The usual definition of the answer sets (stable models) of a logic program Π is
given in terms of the minimal models of a reduct program ΠX constructed from
Π and a given interpretation X . The original answer sets semantics was defined
in (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988) and (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991) for special cases
of nonnested programs, and extended in (Lifschitz et al. 1999) for programs with
nested expressions. However, these definitions were later subsumed by a general
logical encoding called Equilibrium Logic (Pearce 1997), which allows considering
answer sets (or equilibrium models) for arbitrary propositional theories as a partic-
ular type of selected models in the logic of here-and-there:
Definition 2 (Answer set/Equilibrium model)
A set Y of atoms is an answer set (or equilibrium model) for a theory T , if for every
subset X of Y , (X,Y ) |= T iff X = Y .
An alternative, reduct-based description of equilibrium models of arbitrary propo-
sitional theory was recently obtained in (Ferraris 2005).
Apart from constituting a monotonic framework in which answer sets can be
defined, the logic of here-and-there further satisfies an interesting property: it allows
capturing the concept of strong equivalence of theories. Two theories T1 and T2 are
strongly equivalent if, for any theory T , T1 ∪ T and T2 ∪ T have the same answer
sets. The main result in (Lifschitz et al. 2001) asserts that this condition holds iff
T1 and T2 are equivalent in the logic of here-and-there.
Our main result can be enunciated now as the following theorem:
Theorem 1 (Main result)
Every propositional theory (of Equilibrium Logic) is strongly equivalent to a logic
program. 
3 Proving Theorem 1 by syntactic transformation
In this proof of Theorem 1, we identify every finite program with the conjunction
of its rules. We also need a few lemmas.
Lemma 1
For any formulas F,G and K,
(F → G)→ K (6)
is equivalent to
(G ∨ ¬F )→ K
K ∨ F ∨ ¬G.
(7)
in the logic of here-and-there.
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Proof
In the proof of the implication from (7) to (6), we assume F → G, and we want to
prove K. We consider the three cases K, F and ¬G from the last formula of (7).
The first case is trivial. If F then G, and if ¬G then ¬F from the hypothesis F → G.
In both cases, the antecedent of the implication in (7) is true, so we can conclude
K as well.
Now we assume (6) and we want to derive each formula of (7). For the first one,
we also assume G∨¬F , and we want to derive K. It is sufficient to notice that both
G and ¬F make the antecedent of (6) — and consequently K — true. To prove
the second formula of (7), we consider the axiom (5). The claim is clearly proven
in the cases F and ¬G. In the remaining case, we obtain K by modus ponens on
F → G and (6).
Lemma 2
The implication of two finite programs is equivalent to a finite program.
Proof
We shall prove that the implication of two programs Π1 → Π2 is equivalent to a
program, by strong induction on the number of rules of Π1. If Π1 is empty (i.e.,
it is ⊤) then Π1 → Π2 is clearly equivalent to Π2. If Π1 consists of a single rule
F → G then
Π1 → Π2 = (F → G)→
( ∧
(H→K)∈Π2
(H → K)
)
⇔
∧
(H→K)∈Π2
((F → G)→ (H → K)).
It remains to notice that each conjunctive term (F → G)→ (H → K) is equivalent
to the conjunction of two rules. Indeed, by Lemma 1,
(F → G)→ (H → K)⇔ H → ((F → G)→ K)
⇔ H → (((G ∨ ¬F )→ K) ∧ (K ∨ F ∨ ¬G))
⇔ (H → ((G ∨ ¬F )→ K)) ∧ (H → (K ∨ F ∨ ¬G))
⇔ ((H ∧ (G ∨ ¬F ))→ K) ∧ (H → (K ∨ F ∨ ¬G))
It remains to consider the case when Π1 contains more than one rule. In this case,
Π1 can be broken into two programs Π
′
1 and Π
′
2 with |Π
′
1| ≤ |Π
′′
1 | < |Π1|. Then,
since
Π1 → Π2 ⇔ (Π
′
1 ∧ Π
′′
1 )→ Π2 ⇔ Π
′
1 → (Π
′′
1 → Π2)
the assertion follows by applying the induction hypothesis twice.
Proof of Theorem 1.
It is sufficient to prove that any theory consisting of a single formula is equivalent
to a finite program, by structural induction. We also assume that such a formula
contains atoms
and connectives ⊥, → and ∧ only (all the other connectives can be eliminated).
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Clearly, every atom and the connective ⊥ are programs. For formulas of the form
F ∧ G and F → G, we assume, as induction hypothesis, that there are two finite
programs equivalent to F and G respectively. Clearly, F ∧ G is equivalent to the
union of such two programs. The existence of a finite program equivalent to F → G
follows from the induction hypothesis and Lemma 2.
To understand how an arbitrary propositional theory is converted into a logic
program, consider formula (2) as a logic program. First of all, we need to remove
the disjunction, so we write it as
((r → (q → p))→ (q → p)) ∧ (((q → p)→ r)→ r). (8)
Then we convert each subformula that is not a logic program into a logic program
bottom-up. Lemma 2 shows how each subformula can be converted, but simplifica-
tions or other transformations can also be applied. For instance, by Lemma 1, the
subformula r → (q → p) is converted into
((q ∧ (r ∨ ¬⊥))→ p) ∧ (q → (p ∨ ⊥ ∨ ¬r))
which can be equivalently rewritten as
(q ∧ r)→ p.
Consequently, the first conjunctive term of (8) becomes
((q ∧ r)→ p)→ (q → p);
this formula, by Lemma 2 again, can be rewritten as
((q ∧ (p ∨ ¬(q ∧ r)))→ p) ∧ (q → (p ∨ (q ∧ r) ∨ ¬p))
which can be simplified into
((q ∧ ¬r)→ p) ∧ (q → (p ∨ r ∨ ¬p)).
With similar steps, we can rewrite the second conjunctive term of (8) as a logic
program. As (8) becomes the conjunction of two programs, it becames a program
itself.
4 Proving Theorem 1 by using countermodels
The main idea of this technique is to start from the countermodels (under the
logic of here-and-there) of some propositional theory T with a finite signature and
construct a logic program, call it Π(T ), which has exactly the same set of coun-
termodels. We can think about the construction of Π(T ) as a process where we
start with an empty program, which would have as models all the possible inter-
pretations, and go adding a rule per each model we want to remove. Note that,
since there can only be a finite number of models and countermodels for a finite
signature, Π(T ) is finite even if T is infinite. In the case of an infinite signature
for T , we can define Π(T ) as the union of Π({F}) (computed on the finite set of
atoms that occur in F ) for each F ∈ T . The form of each rule in Π(T ) is defined
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Definition 3 (rX,Y )
Given an interpretation (X,Y ) under some propositional signature Σ, we define
rX,Y as the (nonnested) rule:
( ∧
b∈X
b
)
∧
( ∧
c∈Σ−Y
¬c
)
→
∨
a∈Y−X
(a ∨ ¬a)

For instance, if Σ = {p, q, r} then r{q},{p,q} is
q ∧ ¬r → p ∨ ¬p.
When the interpretation is total, the head (Y, Y ) of rY,Y is empty, leading to the
constraint:
( ∧
b∈Y
b
)
∧
( ∧
c∈Σ−Y
¬c
)
→ ⊥
For instance, with Σ = {p, q, r}, r{q},{q} is
q ∧ ¬p ∧ ¬r → ⊥.
From the definition of satisfaction in the logic of here-and-there, it is not difficult
to see that (X,Y ) is always a countermodel of rX,Y . Moreover, when X ⊂ Y , this
is indeed the only countermodel. When X = Y , however, Property 1 may lead to
additional countermodels, as reflected by the following proposition:
Proposition 1
Given any interpretation (X,Y ), an interpretation (X ′, Y ′) is a countermodel of
rX,Y iff
i) Y ′ = Y , if X = Y , and
ii) X ′ = X , Y ′ = Y otherwise.
To prove this result, the following lemma will be particularly useful:
Lemma 3
Let (X,Y ) and (X ′, Y ′) be a pair of interpretations. Then,
(X ′, Y ′) |= body(rX,Y ) iff X ⊆ X
′ ⊆ Y ′ ⊆ Y.
Proof
Note first that X ′ ⊆ Y ′ trivially follows from the form of interpretations. We have
that (X ′, Y ′) |= body(rX,Y ) iff
(X ′, Y ′) |= b for all b ∈ X , and (X ′, Y ′) |= ¬c for all c ∈ Σ− Y .
By Property 2, we can rewrite this condition as
b ∈ X ′ for all b ∈ X , and c 6∈ Y ′ for all c 6∈ Y
and then as
b ∈ X ⇒ b ∈ X ′, and c 6∈ Y ⇒ c 6∈ Y ′.
This is clearly equivalent to X ⊆ X ′ and Y ′ ⊆ Y .
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Proof of Proposition 1
i) If X = Y then head(rX,Y ) = ⊥ so that rX,Y can be rewritten as ¬body(rX,Y ).
Consequently, by Property 2, the countermodels of rX,Y are the interpretations
(X ′, Y ′) such that Y ′ satisfies body(rX,Y ) in classical logic. It remains to notice
that, in this case, body(rX,Y ) is the conjunction of all literals classically satisfied
by Y , and so, this guarantees Y ′ = Y .
ii) If X 6= Y , we must have X ⊂ Y , by the form of interpretations. We show first
that (X,Y ) is not model of rX,Y . To this aim, it suffices to show that (X,Y ) |=
body(rX,Y ) but (X,Y ) 6|= head(rX,Y ). The satisfaction of the body trivially follows
from Lemma 3 (take X ′ = X and Y ′ = Y ). For the head, take the disjunction
a ∨ ¬a in head(rX,Y ) for each a ∈ Y −X . Since a 6∈ X we get (X,Y ) 6|= a whereas
since a ∈ Y , Y 6|= ¬a and, by Property 2, (X,Y ) 6|= ¬a.
Now, it remains to prove that any interpretation (X ′, Y ′) different from (X,Y ) is a
model of rX,Y . Note first that as Y −X is not empty, rX,Y is a tautology in classical
logic, since its head contains at least a disjunction like a ∨ ¬a. Therefore, Y |=
rX,Y and we just have to show that (X
′, Y ′) |= head(rX,Y ) whenever (X ′, Y ′) |=
body(rX,Y ). If we assume the latter, from Lemma 3 we conclude X ⊆ X ′ ⊆ Y ′ ⊆ Y ,
but as (X ′, Y ′) is different from (X,Y ) then either X ⊂ X ′ or Y ′ ⊂ Y . Assume
first that there exists some atom d ∈ X ′−X . Since X ′ ⊆ Y , we get d ∈ Y −X , and
so d is one of the atoms a in the head of rX,Y . As d ∈ X ′, we have (X ′, Y ′) |= d
and so (X ′, Y ′) |= head(rX,Y ). On the other hand, if we assume that there exists
some d ∈ Y − Y ′, as X ⊆ Y ′, we conclude d ∈ Y − X and so, d is again one
of the atoms in head(rX,Y ). Now, as d 6∈ Y ′, by Property 2, (X ′, Y ′) |= ¬d and
(X ′, Y ′) |= head(rX,Y ).
A set S of interpretations is total-closed if given any total (Y, Y ) ∈ S then also
(X,Y ) ∈ S for any X ⊆ Y . Clearly, a theory has a total-closed set of countermodels
by Property 1. Then the main theorem immediately follows from the following
theorem.
Theorem 2
Each total-closed set S of interpretations is the set of countermodels of a nonnested
logic program:
Π(S)
def
= {rX,Y | (X,Y ) ∈ S}
Proof
Any interpretation (X,Y ) is a countermodel of rX,Y by Proposition 1, so every
element of S is a countermodel of Π(S). Now take any countermodel (X,Y ) of
Π(S). By construction of Π(S) and Proposition 1 this means that either rX,Y or
rY,Y belongs to Π(S). Consequently, either (X,Y ) or (Y, Y ) is element of S. Since
S is total-closed, we conclude that (X,Y ) ∈ S.
For instance, consider formula (2). As its 6 countermodels are
(∅, {q}), ({q}, {q}), ({q}, {p, q}), (∅, {q, r}), ({q}, {q, r}), ({q}, {p, q, r}),
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it is strongly equivalent to the 6 rules
¬p ∧ ¬r → q ∨ ¬q
q ∧ ¬p ∧ ¬r → ⊥
q ∧ ¬r → p ∨ ¬p
¬p → q ∨ ¬q ∨ r ∨ ¬r
q ∧ ¬p → r ∨ ¬r
q → p ∨ ¬p ∨ r ∨ ¬r.
The one-to-one correspondence between total-closed sets of intepretations and
the “classes” of strongly equivalent programs shown by Theorem 2 can be used to
count the number of such classes.
Theorem 3
The number of different logic programs (modulo strong equivalence) that can be
built for a finite signature of n atoms is:
n∏
i=0
(
22
i−1 + 1
)(ni)
Proof
We need to count the number of total-closed sets S of interpretations. For any S,
let SY be the subset of S consisting of the elements of the form (X,Y ). Clearly
each SY is independent from SY ′ if Y
′ 6= Y , so the number of values of S is the
product of the number of values of SY for each Y ⊆ Σ. If (Y, Y ) 6∈ SY then SY can
independently contain or not each term of the form (X,Y ) where X is a proper
subset of Y . There are 2|Y |−1 of such subsets giving 22
|Y |−1 total combinations. On
the other hand, when (Y, Y ) ∈ S, SY is completely determined as {(X,Y ) |X ⊆ Y },
since S is total-closed. Consequently the total number of values for S is
∏
Y⊆Σ
(
22
|Y |−1 + 1
)
The final result is obtained by grouping all sets Y with the same cardinality, and
by noticing that the sets Y of size i are
(
n
i
)
.
5 Normal Forms
The reader may have noticed that Theorem 2 seems, in principle, stronger than the
original claim: we know now that any theory is strongly equivalent to a nonnested
logic program. Nevertheless, this was also implicitly asserted by Theorem 1, since
as we had seen, a nested program can always be transformed into a nonnested one
under strong equivalence (Lifschitz et al. 1999). Thus, both proofs actually point
out that nonnested logic programs act as a kind of normal form for the logic of
here-and-there. Furthermore, they show a strong analogy to CNF in classical logic:
we can understand the program as a conjunction of nonnested rules which, in their
turn, are seen as clauses. The method in Section 4 is then completely analogous to
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the construction of the classical CNF of a formula starting from its countermodels.
In both cases, we build a rule/clause per each countermodel, and this clause refers
to all the atoms of the signature.
In classical logic, however, we know that the construction of CNF from the theory
countermodels is completely dual to the construction of DNF from its models. So,
the following question arises immediately: is there some kind of disjunctive normal
form for the logic of here-and-there that can be built starting from the theory
models? The answer is affirmative, as we show next.
Definition 4
Given an interpretation (X,Y ) for a finite signature Σ, let cX,Y be the formula
( ∧
a∈X
a
)
∧
( ∧
b∈Σ−Y
¬b
)
∧
( ∧
c∈Y−X
¬¬c
)
∧
∧
d,e∈Y−X
(d→ e).

For instance, if Σ = {p, q, r} then c{q},{p,q} is
q ∧ ¬r ∧ ¬¬p ∧ (p→ p).
The interesting properties of cX,Y are stated in the next Peoposition and Theo-
rem.
Proposition 2
The only interpretations that satisfy cX,Y are (X,Y ) and (Y, Y ).
Proof
Consider the following formulas c′X,Y and c
′′
X,Y :
c′X,Y
def
=
∧
c∈Y−X
¬¬c c′′X,Y
def
=
∧
d,e∈Y−X
(d→ e)
Clearly, cX,Y = body(rX,Y ) ∧ c
′
X,Y ∧ c
′′
X,Y . We are going to see for which condi-
tions the three terms body(rX,Y ), c
′
X,Y and c
′′
X,Y are satisfied by an interpretation
(X ′, Y ′). Each formula ¬¬c in c′X,Y is satisfied by (X
′, Y ′) iff Y ′ |= c by Property 2.
That means that (X ′, Y ′) |= c′X,Y iff Y −X ⊆ Y
′, or, equivalently, iff Y ⊆ Y ′ ∪X .
On the other hand, by Lemma 3, (X ′, Y ′) |= body(rX,Y ) iff X ⊆ X ′ ⊆ Y ′ ⊆ Y . No-
tice that if X ⊆ Y ′ then Y ′ ∪X = Y ′. Consequently, (X ′, Y ′) |= body(rX,Y )∧ c′X,Y
iff
X ⊆ X ′ ⊆ Y ′ = Y.
That means that the only models for cX,Y are the ones of the form (X
′, Y ) withX ⊆
X ′ ⊆ Y , that satisfy c′′X,Y . Since Y contains all the consequents of the implications of
c′′X,Y , then Y |= c
′′
X,Y . If we consider that X doesn’t contain any of the antecedents,
then (X,Y ) |= c′′X,Y , and also (Y, Y ) |= c
′′
X,Y by Property 1. It remains to show
that if X ⊂ X ′ ⊂ Y then (X ′, Y ) 6|= c′′X,Y . This is immediate, since c
′′
X,Y contains
an implication d→ e with d ∈ X ′ and e 6∈ X ′.
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Theorem 4
Let T be a theory over a finite signature and let F (T ) denote the formula con-
structed from the models of T :
F (T )
def
=
∨
(X,Y ) : (X,Y )|=T
cX,Y .
Then T is equivalent to F (T ) under the logic of here-and-there.
Proof
Take any model (X,Y ) of T . Then, cX,Y is a disjunctive term in F (T ). Since
(X,Y ) |= cX,Y by Proposition 2, we can conclude that (X,Y ) |= F (T ). Now take
any model (X,Y ) of F (T ). That means that, by Proposition 2, (X,Y ) satisfies
some disjunctive term cX′,Y of F (T ), where
• X = X ′, if X ⊂ Y , and
• X ′ ⊆ Y , if X = Y .
We know that (X ′, Y ) |= T by construction of F (T ). Consequently, if X ⊂ Y
then (X,Y ) is a model of T because (X ′, Y ) = (X,Y ). For the case X = Y , it is
sufficient to notice that (X,Y ) = (Y, Y ), and that (X ′, Y ) |= T implies (Y, Y ) |= T
by Property 1.
For instance, consider formula (2). As its 21 models are
(∅, ∅), (∅, {p}), ({p}, {p}), (∅, {r}), ({r}, {r}), (∅, {p, q}), ({p}, {p, q}),
({p, q}, {p, q}), ({p}, {q, r}), ({p, q}, {q, r}), (X, {p, r}), (Y, {p, q, r}),
(X ⊆ {p, r} and Y ⊆ {p, q, r}, Y 6= {q})
it is strongly equivalent to the disjunction of
¬p ∧ ¬q ∧ ¬r
¬q ∧ ¬r ∧ ¬¬p ∧ (p→ p)
p ∧ ¬q ∧ ¬r
¬p ∧ ¬q ∧ ¬¬r ∧ (r → r)
¬r ∧ ¬¬p ∧ ¬¬q ∧ (p→ p) ∧ (p→ q) ∧ (q → p) ∧ (q → q)
...
As a final remark, note that F (T ) is a disjunction of clauses cX,Y which are
in their turn conjunctions of expressions of a very restricted type: each one may
involve negation, implications, and (at most two) atoms, but no conjunction or
disjunction. It must be said, however, that we still ignore whether F (T ) may have
any practical interest at all for computing answer sets.
6 Conclusions
We have shown that when we consider answer sets for arbitrary propositional the-
ories (that is, Equilibrium Logic) we actually obtain the same expressiveness than
when we just deal with disjunctive programs that allow negation in the head. To
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this aim, we proved that for any propositional theory, there always exists a strongly
equivalent logic program, i.e., a program that may safely replace the original theory
in terms of answer sets, even in the context of additional information. In fact, to
be precise, our result shows that disjunctive logic programs (with negation in the
head) constitute a conjunctive normal form for the monotonic basis of Equilibrium
Logic, the intermediate logic of here-and-there.
We actually provided two different proofs for this result: one consisting in a
recursive syntactic transformation, and a second one that deals with countermod-
els of the propositional theory in the logic of here-and-there. The reason for pre-
senting the two proofs is that, in both cases, they provide technical tools for ob-
taining additional results. For instance, the proof based on the recursive transfor-
mation can be adapted to generalize the Completion Lemma for logic programs
from (Ferraris and Lifschitz 2005) to the case of propositional theories: the new
statement of the lemma is almost as general as the statement from (Ferraris 2005).
On the other hand, the technique based on countermodels has helped us to estab-
lish for the first time, as far as we know, the number of different programs (modulo
strong-equivalence) that can be built with a given number of atoms. Furthermore,
this technique has also opened research work under development (Cabalar et al. 2006)
that studies the generation of a minimal program from a set of countermodels,
analogously to the methods (Quine 1952; McCluskey 1956) for minimizing boolean
functions in classical logic, well-known in digital circuit design.
The main focus in this technical note was just to prove the existence of a strongly
equivalent program for any propositional theory, leaving more detailed related top-
ics to be treated in subsequent work. Consequently, the methods we present to
obtain the resulting program are mostly thought to achieve simple proofs of the
main result, rather than to obtain an efficient computation or a more compact
representation of the final program itself. As an example of work directly derived
from the current result, but perhaps more interesting from a computational view-
point, (Cabalar et al. 2005) presented a pair of alternative syntactic transforma-
tions to reduce a propositional theory into a strongly equivalent logic program.
One of the transformations preserves the vocabulary of the original theory, but
is exponential in the obtained program size, whereas the other is polynomial, but
with the cost of adding auxiliary atoms. (Cabalar et al. 2005) further confirms this
complexity result for nonnested programs, actually proving that no polynomial time
transformation to nonnested programs can be obtained if we preserve the original
vocabulary. The existence of polynomial space/time strongly equivalent translations
to programs with nested expressions is an open question.
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